In this paper we are concerned with the clarity of political signals transmitted through political
conversation and the accuracy with which those signals are perceived. The social communication of
political information is subject to distortion effects that arise due to skewed expectations on the part
of the receiver and ambiguous representations on the part of the sender. Indeed, communication that
occurs between two citizens might be distorted either by characteristics of the individuals who are
transmitting and receiving messages, or by characteristics of the setting in which the information is
being transmitted. We argue that the power of majority opinion is magnified by the inferential devices
that citizens use to reach judgments in the face of ambiguous political messages and hence the use
of a personal experience heuristic gives rise to a political bias that favors the continued dominance
of majority opinion.
ow important is political communication among citizens? Political discussion
is an efficient vehicle for becoming informed about politics (Downs 1957);
it is a widespread activity with influential consequences (Berelson, Lazarsfeld,
and McPhee 1954; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and
Gaudet 1944); and it may be fundamentally important to the vitality of democratic
politics. At the same time, relatively few citizens demonstrate highly
intense levels of political interest and engagement (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady
1995); politics is only one among many important topics competing for airtime
during citizens' conversations (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995); few of the com Nested Environmental Effects 997
municated opinions are likely to be carefully researched (Sniderman, Brody, and
Tetlock 1991); and many of the political messages delivered through social
communication consist of offhand comments and the very briefest expressions
of sentiment. For all these reasons, a great deal of political discussion and communication
is likely to be imbedded in ambiguity and uncertainty. And the
uncertainty of ambiguous communication gives rise to distortions based on the
characteristics of the person sending the message, the characteristics of the person
receiving the message, and the various environments and settings within
which the message is interpreted.
In this paper we are concerned with the clarity of political signals transmitted
through political conversation and the accuracy with which those signals are
perceived. The potential for distorted communication arises due to individual
and environmental effects operating at several nested and overlapping levels.
First, social communication regarding politics is subject to distortion effects that
arise both due to skewed expectations on the part of the receiver and ambiguous
representations on the part of the sender. Second, political discussion often occurs
at the discretion of individual citizens, within the closely defined social
environments where they are located, but the distribution of political opinions
within these microenvironments depends on the supply of viewpoints available
in the larger political community, thereby truncating the distribution of political
preferences to which citizens are regularly exposed (Huckfeldt et al. 1995;
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). Third, the level of distortion in dyadic information
flows is contingent not only on the characteristics of the individuals
involved in the dyad, but also on expectations that are formed on the basis of
individual experience. These experiences, in turn, depend on the immediate circumstances
of a person's location within these microenvironments. Finally, in
assessing political communication, individuals employ methods of inferential
judgment that, while yielding relatively accurate judgments in the aggregate,
might give rise to a bias fostering the continued dominance of majority opinion
(Miller 1956). In short, our analytic framework examines political communication
within a series of nested environmental levels: individuals within dyads,
dyads within microenvironments, and microenvironments within larger environments
of opinion.
We begin by addressing a number of substantive issues: the importance of disagreement
among citizens, the factors that give rise to ambiguity and distortion
in political communication, and the sources of a majoritarian bias in political
communication and cognition. A Bayesian logic of inference is then articulated
for examining nested environmental effects on political communication. Finally,
based on an empirical analysis of the 1992 election, we assess the levels of political
disagreement experienced by a national sample of survey respondents and
their discussants, the extent to which perceptions of disagreement are contingent
on the externally imposed supply of preferences in the surrounding macroenvironment,
the accuracy of political communication between main respondents and R. Huckfeldt, P Beck, R. Dalton, J Levine, and W Morgan
their discussants, and sources of distortion in the perceptions of discussants' political
preferences.
Disagreement, Ambiguity, and the Effectiveness of Communication
If political discussion is to play an important role in democratic politics, it
must introduce new information and new ideas to citizens, thereby creating
disagreement as the inevitable by-product of deliberation (Granovetter 1973;
McPhee 1963). If people only talk politics with others holding compatible
views-or if they wrongly perceive their social contacts to hold sympathetic
views-they may be spared the social and political discomfort of disagreement,
but the communication of diverse political preferences is rendered ineffective.'
Several factors might be expected to affect the level of political diversity-and
hence the exposure to disagreement-across the range of a citizen's social contacts.
First, the combination of segregated social groups and polarized political
preferences reduces the likelihood of encountering alternative political viewpoints
(Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989). Second, the level of political homogeneity
within a citizen's social space is increased to the extent that citizens employ politically
relevant selection criteria in constructing their own patterns of social
interaction, thereby locating themselves in politically agreeable microenvironments
(Finifter 1974). Finally, to the extent that individuals are either unable or
disinclined to censor their patterns of political communication, the distribution
of political viewpoints in the larger environment takes on heightened importance
as a factor that affects individual exposure to alternative political viewpoints
(Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). In short, the level of exposure
to disagreement and diversity within patterns of political communication
is problematic, both across groups and across individuals, and hence the vitality
of democratic discourse is an open question.
Just as important, while environmental supply and individual control affect the
probabilities of exposure to alternative political viewpoints, exposure alone does
not insure the effective communication of political disagreement. In order for
politically diverse and disagreeable viewpoints to be communicated effectively,
it is also necessary that they be perceived correctly. In this sense, effective communication
depends on accurate perception. Of course, inaccurately perceived
messages may also be influential, and for many purposes it is the perceived message
that is most important for the choices that a citizen makes. But this does not
alter the fact that incorrect perception has the potential to obscure and disguise
diversity and disagreement at both the individual and aggregate levels.
Several different factors serve to obscure rather than clarify the perception and
expression of socially communicated political information. First, it may be help-
'None of this is meant to suggest that political disagreement is necessarily or inevitably an unpleasant
experience for all individuals. Indeed, for some individuals, the expressive benefits of
political discussion may even be increased as a consequence of disagreement (Fiorina 1990) R. Huckfeldt, P Beck, R. Dalton, J Levine, and W Morgan
their discussants, and sources of distortion in the perceptions of discussants' political
preferences.
Disagreement, Ambiguity, and the Effectiveness of Communication
If political discussion is to play an important role in democratic politics, it
must introduce new information and new ideas to citizens, thereby creating
disagreement as the inevitable by-product of deliberation (Granovetter 1973;
McPhee 1963). If people only talk politics with others holding compatible
views-or if they wrongly perceive their social contacts to hold sympathetic
views-they may be spared the social and political discomfort of disagreement,
but the communication of diverse political preferences is rendered ineffective.'
Several factors might be expected to affect the level of political diversity-and
hence the exposure to disagreement-across the range of a citizen's social contacts.
First, the combination of segregated social groups and polarized political
preferences reduces the likelihood of encountering alternative political viewpoints
(Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989). Second, the level of political homogeneity
within a citizen's social space is increased to the extent that citizens employ politically
relevant selection criteria in constructing their own patterns of social
interaction, thereby locating themselves in politically agreeable microenvironments
(Finifter 1974). Finally, to the extent that individuals are either unable or
disinclined to censor their patterns of political communication, the distribution
of political viewpoints in the larger environment takes on heightened importance
as a factor that affects individual exposure to alternative political viewpoints
(Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). In short, the level of exposure
to disagreement and diversity within patterns of political communication
is problematic, both across groups and across individuals, and hence the vitality
of democratic discourse is an open question.
Just as important, while environmental supply and individual control affect the
probabilities of exposure to alternative political viewpoints, exposure alone does
not insure the effective communication of political disagreement. In order for
politically diverse and disagreeable viewpoints to be communicated effectively,
it is also necessary that they be perceived correctly. In this sense, effective communication
depends on accurate perception. Of course, inaccurately perceived
messages may also be influential, and for many purposes it is the perceived message
that is most important for the choices that a citizen makes. But this does not
alter the fact that incorrect perception has the potential to obscure and disguise
diversity and disagreement at both the individual and aggregate levels.
Several different factors serve to obscure rather than clarify the perception and
expression of socially communicated political information. First, it may be help-
'None of this is meant to suggest that political disagreement is necessarily or inevitably an unpleasant
experience for all individuals. Indeed, for some individuals, the expressive benefits of
political discussion may even be increased as a consequence of disagreement (Fiorina 1990)R. Huckfeldt, P Beck, R. Dalton, J Levine, and W Morgan
their discussants, and sources of distortion in the perceptions of discussants' political
preferences.
Disagreement, Ambiguity, and the Effectiveness of Communication
If political discussion is to play an important role in democratic politics, it
must introduce new information and new ideas to citizens, thereby creating
disagreement as the inevitable by-product of deliberation (Granovetter 1973;
McPhee 1963). If people only talk politics with others holding compatible
views-or if they wrongly perceive their social contacts to hold sympathetic
views-they may be spared the social and political discomfort of disagreement,
but the communication of diverse political preferences is rendered ineffective.'
Several factors might be expected to affect the level of political diversity-and
hence the exposure to disagreement-across the range of a citizen's social contacts.
First, the combination of segregated social groups and polarized political
preferences reduces the likelihood of encountering alternative political viewpoints
(Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989). Second, the level of political homogeneity
within a citizen's social space is increased to the extent that citizens employ politically
relevant selection criteria in constructing their own patterns of social
interaction, thereby locating themselves in politically agreeable microenvironments
(Finifter 1974). Finally, to the extent that individuals are either unable or
disinclined to censor their patterns of political communication, the distribution
of political viewpoints in the larger environment takes on heightened importance
as a factor that affects individual exposure to alternative political viewpoints
(Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). In short, the level of exposure
to disagreement and diversity within patterns of political communication
is problematic, both across groups and across individuals, and hence the vitality
of democratic discourse is an open question.
Just as important, while environmental supply and individual control affect the
probabilities of exposure to alternative political viewpoints, exposure alone does
not insure the effective communication of political disagreement. In order for
politically diverse and disagreeable viewpoints to be communicated effectively,
it is also necessary that they be perceived correctly. In this sense, effective communication
depends on accurate perception. Of course, inaccurately perceived
messages may also be influential, and for many purposes it is the perceived message
that is most important for the choices that a citizen makes. But this does not
alter the fact that incorrect perception has the potential to obscure and disguise
diversity and disagreement at both the individual and aggregate levels.
Several different factors serve to obscure rather than clarify the perception and
expression of socially communicated political information. First, it may be help-
'None of this is meant to suggest that political disagreement is necessarily or inevitably an unpleasant
experience for all individuals. Indeed, for some individuals, the expressive benefits of
political discussion may even be increased as a consequence of disagreement (Fiorina 1990)Nested Environmental Effects ful to understand the ambiguous communication of political messages from a
strategic standpoint (MacKuen 1990). The costs of social communication sometimes
increase when disagreement is present in a relationship: for instance, it is
often painful to tell highly opinionated relatives that their preferred presidential
candidate is a loser! In such situations, the cost can be reduced by obfuscation if
not complete avoidance. The receiver obtains an obscure message because the
sender has strategically chosen to engage in political retreat. Hence, ambiguity is
increased, and the likelihood of distorted communication is heightened. Second,
not all ambiguity is the residue of strategic interaction. A great deal of political
conversation is casual and offhand, occurring among citizens whose opinions are
only weakly formulated. Thus, at one extreme we might expect ambiguity to increase
as a consequence of intensely held opinions that increase the potential for
conflict and thereby produce strategic retreat. At the other extreme, we might
also expect ambiguity to be generated by weak or nonexistent opinions that generate
vague political signals (Fazio 1990; Latane 1981; Petty and Cacioppo
1986). In summary, for a number of systematic reasons, a great deal of political
communication is inevitably ambiguous and open to alternative interpretations.
When citizens are confronted with ambiguous political messages, the potential
for distorted communication is enhanced, and several mechanisms of distortion
are well known. In particular, selective perception makes it possible for individuals
to avoid, disregard, and transform messages that do not agree with their own
preconceptions and viewpoints. While earlier explanations for these patterns of
selective perception were anchored in dissonance theories (Festinger 1957; Fiske
and Taylor 1991), it is also possible to address these processes on the basis of alternative
concepts in the newer arsenal of political cognition research (Ottati and
Wyer 1990). For example, individuals who receive messages that do not correspond
with preexisting conceptions may simply lack a cognitive structure to
incorporate the information, thereby integrating it in an inappropriate manner
(Lodge and Hamill 1986). In the present context, they might incorrectly identify
the message being communicated through political discussion.
Ambiguity, Context, and Cognition
Particularly in the context of ambiguous political messages, people are also
likely to employ contextually based cognitive shortcuts in evaluating socially
communicated information. In their classic articulations of representativeness
and availability as judgmental heuristics, Kahneman and Tversky (1973; Tversky
and Kahneman 1973, 1974) demonstrate that individuals often make judgments
that seem most representative of the evidence, guided by the availability of similar
past experiences (see also Kinder 1978; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock
1991). In the present context, consider the following evaluations of a coworker's
political preference. First: Joe is a good guy; he is a lot like me; I'm voting for
Bill Clinton; Joe will probably vote for Clinton too. Alternatively: Joe is a good R. Huckfeldt, P Beck, R. Dalton, J Levine, and W Morgan
guy; he is a lot like the other people at work; most of them are voting for Bill
Clinton; Joe will probably vote for Clinton too. In either case, expectations regarding
Joe's behavior are not seriously called into question by the (perhaps
intentionally) obscure message that Joe is sending.2
Mechanisms such as these might be seen in the context of behavioral and
hence imperfect implementations of a Bayesian logic with prior information updated
by (biased) sample data. When citizens interpret an ambiguous signal sent
though social communication, they might evaluate that signal in the context of
prior information, but where does such information originate? One answer is that
the prior information is based on support levels in the larger environment: people
who live in Democratic counties, for example, might reasonably expect their
associates to be Democrats. This prior information is combined with sample
data, where the sample data are obtained through personal experience-personal
experience that arises due to the citizen's own biased sample of social encounters
accumulated during everyday routines. Bayesian logic may not come naturally to
many citizens, however, and experimental results indicate that people rely heavily
on their own vivid experience (the sample data), while they systematically
undervalue the prior information-Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) base rate.
Several questions quite naturally arise with respect to socially communicated
political information: How important are such informal sample data in the evaluation
of political communication? How important is the prior information?
While cognitive shortcuts may be quite efficient and perform quite well overall,
they might also give rise to distortions and communication failures. In terms
of political communication between discussion partners, empirical demonstrations
of misperception and systematic bias in political cognition are readily
available. Citizens are certainly more likely to perceive discussants' preferences
accurately if they share the discussants' preferences (Huckfeldt et al. 1995;
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), but these empirical demonstrations show something
else as well. The perception of a discussant's political preference depends
on contextual opinion distributions-the perception is biased in the direction of
environmental preference distributions quite independently of the discussant's
true preference. How should we explain these environmental effects?
One explanation focuses on the importance of the external macroenvironment:
people who live in Republican or Democratic communities might be more
likely to generalize on the basis of these external environments when making
judgments regarding a particular political message received through social communication.
Consider the 1992 campaign in the context of a traditionally
2A direct parallel is readily drawn between these personal experience heuristics, on the one hand,
and the structural equivalence explanations invoked by network theorists, on the other (Burt 1987).
In particular, the representativeness argument suggests that people base their social and political cognitions
of other individuals on the extent to which these other individuals can be seen to represent
particular social categories. According to structural equivalence, one very important form of social
influence derives from the extent to which one individual sees another as occupying a similar location
in social structure. In both instances, social location drives perception.
